教育部人文社科重点研究基地中央财经大学中国精算研究院学术活动

主题：Low Level Equilibrium and Agricultural Productivity Traps under China’s Dynastic Rule

Abstract：

In this paper we examine the evolution of China’s agricultural economy up to the Republican era through the lens of low level equilibrium and agricultural productivity traps. Throughout the centuries Chinese farmers and agricultural development has ebbed and flowed depending on two seemingly unrelated factors; The first is through weather patterns and the frequency of droughts and other natural catastrophes that often led to a Malthusian purge of population and labor through famine and disaster. The second influence is dynastic, and whether an emperor behaved as a tyrant or a benevolent despot.

This paper pieces together elements of natural disaster and degrees of despotism across dynasties to explain why, up to the beginning of the Republican era in 1912, Chinese agriculture was so underdeveloped technologically. We present new ideas about patterns of high and low level equilibrium traps and how these coincided with agricultural productivity traps in a fractional and dynamic way.

By examining patterns of drought and the ‘attitudes’ of emperors towards agricultural development and the peasantry we open up a new avenue to exploring China’s agricultural economic history.

主讲人：ProfessorCalum G. Turvey（康奈尔大学）

康奈尔大学农业金融、应用经济与管理学终身教授；罗格斯大学农业食品与资源经济系教授。现担任杂志Agricultural Finance Review主编，加拿大农业经济学杂志编委。“保险风险分析与决策”学科创新引智基地海外学术大师之一。Turvey教授主要研究农业金融和风险管理，近几年来，主要从事发展中国家（主要是中国、印度、肯尼亚和多米尼加共和国等）农村信用问题的研究，特别感兴趣的是在中国和印度之间的非正式信用关系的研究，对信贷需求和信贷需求弹性，和评估基于风险的或有信用的天气风险和其他形式的微信用保险专业产品的使用。

时间：2017年3月31日， 下午2:00—3:00

地点：中央财经大学学术会堂702

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