教育部人文社科重点研究基地中央财经大学中国精算研究院学术活动
精算论坛讲座第154期—Xuezhong He
(2018年12月12日)
报告题目：EFFORT, EFFICIENCY ANDWELFARE
报告时间：2018年12月12日（周三）上午10:00—11:30
报告人：Xuezhong He
Xue-Zhong He 教授现任悉尼科技大学商学院（ UTSBusiness School ）教授(Professor of Finance)，主要活跃于金融市场建模、异质信念下的资产定价和非线性经济动力学等领域，在Journal ofEconomic Dynamics and Control、Journal ofEconomic Behavior and Organization 、European Journal of Finance 、SIAM 、Journal ofEvolutionary Economics和QuantitativeFinance等国际主流学术期刊上发表文章50多篇，撰写了Handbook of FinancialMarkets: Dynamics and Evolution（Elsevier）、Handbook on Information Technology inFinance（Springer）等10余部学术书籍的部分章节。此外，Xue-Zhong He教授担任本领域三大顶尖国际学术期刊之一Journal ofEconomic Dynamics and Control的主编（Co-Editor）；还担任Journal of EconomicInteraction and Coordination、JournalDifferential Equations and Dynamical Systems 和Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 等国际学术期刊的副主编（Associate Editor）。
报告摘要: In theGrossman-Stiglitz model of noisy rational expectation, it is well known thatthe more information prices convey, the worse off everybody can be. In otherwords, there is a negative relationship between price efficiency and socialwelfare. We show that this result can be reverted when instead of paying afixed cost for information, investors are uncertain whether they will become informed,and can make an effort to reduce this uncertainty. The optimal choice of theprobability for investors to become informed can be characterized in anoncooperative Nash equilibrium game of information acquisition. We show thatprice efficiency can improve investors' welfare when the disutility of theeffort is a convex function of the probability to become informed. Thusinformation acquisition is not always welfare-reducing as the literaturesuggests.
报告地点：中央财经大学学术会堂南楼506（精算院会议室）
欢迎各位老师和同学积极参加！
